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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RUTH :31. DIXON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
WILLIAM D. DIXON, 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by the plaintiff against the 
defendant for a divorce, a property settlement and cus-
tody of the three minor children. Defendant's attorney 
filed a demurrer to the complaint, but later withdrew it 
and defendant consented that his default be entered. No 
answer was filed by the defendant. 
In her complaint filed May 28, 1948 (T-4), in addi-
tion to asking for the custody of the children she asked 
that she be awarded title to an auto tourist camp in 
Vernal, Utah, which the parties had purchased in 1946 
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for the sum of $10,000.00 of which sum $5,000.00 \vas to 
be paid as a down payment and thereafter $1,000.00 a 
year until the balance had been paid in full with interest 
at 6% per annum. The down payment was made in 1946 
and one payment of $1,000.00 was made in 1947, and that 
at the time the complaint was :filed there \vas a balance 
due and owing of $4,000.00 on a mortgage in favor cf 
the Bank of Vernal. The complaint further asked that 
the defendant be required to pay off the balance of the 
indebtedness on the real estate. She also asked for the 
household furniture used in one of the cabins for a home 
for the family and the furniture and equipment in the 
other cabins and all other personal property they had 
accumulated except one vVhite Truck which the defendant 
used in his work as a plumber and steam fitter. 
The original decree was entered ( T -9) on the 28th 
day of September, 1948, giving her the custody of the 
children and $75.00 a month for their support. In dis-
tributing the property the court awarded her all of the 
personal property except the truck and also the tourist 
cabins in lieu of alimony and defendant was to quit claim 
all his right, title and interest to her subject to the 
mortgage and other indebtedness on the cabins, but that 
in the event that plaintiff defaults in making the pay-
ments on the mortgage and other indebtedness secured 
by the real estate then the defendant had the right to 
pay off the indebtedness, take over the cabins and plain-
tiff was to give a quit claim deed of all her right, title 
nnd interest in the cabins to the defendant. 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In :Jiny of 1949, defendant filed a petition ( T-1) to 
modify the decree alleging that the plaintiff had de-
faulted in her payments of insurance, interest and prin-
cipal on the mortgage and defendant demanded that he 
be R\Yarded the title to the cabins under the terms of the 
original decree and that the plaintiff be required to give 
him a quit claim deed to all her right, title and interest 
in said real estate. 
The petition further alleged that on account of 
plaintiff's mental and physical condition that she had 
been unable to manage the cabins that she had incurred 
further indebtedness on the cabins and that if he had 
not paid off the indebtedness the property would have 
been lost. 
He further alleged that she was not in a physical or 
mental condition to take care of the children and also 
asked that they be awarded to him with right of visita-
tion. He also asked that she be awarded the sum of 
$50.00 a month for her support and maintenance when 
she did not have the children. There was no answer on 
cross petition or affidavits filed by the said plaintiff to 
said petition and an order was made June 24, 1949 (T-15) 
setting a hearing on the petition for the 8th day of July, 
1949, and that a notice was served upon her and her 
attorney requiring her to appear before the court on 
that date. 
The parties were in court on that day, but it is dif-
ficult to determine just what took place because of the 
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discrepancies between the court reporter's notes and the 
order modifying the decree (T-17) which was subse-
quently filed. 
On August 30, 1950, the plaintiff filed a petition 
( T -22) to modify the decree ''for the return of the 
property awarded plaintiff and the custody of the minor 
children in accordance with the terms of the original 
decree of divorce and for other relief." 
On September 15, 1950, defendant filed an answer 
to the petition (T-26) of plaintiff to modify the petition 
and asked the same to be denied. It was on the issues 
joined in the petition and answer that a hearing was 
held on the 28th day of September, 1950. It is from the 
Findings and Decision made and entered by the ~ourt 
on the 22nd day of November, 1950, following the hearing 
that this appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
The appellant relies upon the following errors for 
a reversal of the judgment rendered in this case. 
POINT ONE 
That the Trial Court erred in making Findings num-
ber 3, 4, and 5 (T-63), to the effect that the formal order 
of modification, signed by one of the Judges of the court 
on March 8, 1950, did not conform to the purported 
minute entry and that the so called minute entry is con-
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trolling, and that the formal order was of no legal effect 
and therefore, null and void, for the reason that the so 
called minute entry "Tas not controlling as a matter of 
la"T in Yie'Y of the fact that a formal order of modifica-
tion 'Yas signed, made and entered by the court. 
POINT TWO 
That the court erred by receding from his position 
at the trial of the case that the formal order of modifi-
cation signed March 8, 1950, was res adjudicata for the 
reason that the defendant "ras precluded by the ruling 
of the court from offering any evidence to show what 
took place in the proceedings of the court on July 8, 1950. 
POINT THREE 
That the court erred in making any modification of 
the previous order at the time of the hearing on Novem-
ber 4, 1950, upon the petition of the plaintiff and answer 
of defendant for the reason that as a matter of law the 
evidence presented was insufficient to show any material 
changes in the circumstances of the parties to warrant 
a modification of the decree as modified. 
POINT FOUR 
That the court erred in making its calculations of 
the respective interests of the parties in the real estate 
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POINT FIVE 
That the court erred in making its calculations of 
the amount of money defendant paid in clearing up the 
indebtedness of the real property in the sum of $730.00 
as set forth in Finding 10 and 11 (T-64 and 65). 
POINT SIX 
That the court erred in making Finding number 13 
(T-65) in which the court required defendant to secure 
payment of purported judgment in the sum of $8,400.00 
by obtaining a life insurance policy in the sum of 
$5,000.00 making the plaintiff the sole beneficiary and 
to keep said policy in full force and effect until said 
judgment was paid in full for the reason that there is no 
evidence in the record to show that the defendant would 
be physically able to obtain such a policy, what the pre-
miums would be at his age and whether he is financially 
able to carry such a policy. 
ARGUMENT 
Point One 
That the Trial Court Erred in Making Findings Number 
3, 4, and 5, (T-63) to the Effect That the Formal Order of 
Modification, Signed by One of the Judges of the Court on 
March 8, 1950, Did Not Conform to the Purported Minute 
Orde~r and That the So Called Minute Order is Controlling, 
and That the Formal Order Was of No Legal Effect and 
Therefore, Null and Void For the Reason That the So Called 
Minute Orde~r Was Not Controlling As a Matter of Law in 
View of the Fact That a Formal Order of Modification Was 
Signed, Made and Entered By the Court. 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Under this assignment it is the contention of the 
defendant that the formal order made and entered 
:Jiarrh 8, 1950, 'Yas the ronrt 's decision and judgment 
and that it superseded any minute entry 'vhich was after-
"~ards made a part of the record in this case. 
In the case of Canadian and A Mortgage Trust 
Company rs. Clarita Land and Investment Cornpany, 71 
Pac. 301, it \\'"as held that a minute entry by the court 
directing that findings and derree be drawn in favor of 
defendants did not constitute the decision of the court 
nor prevent it from subsequently rendering a decision 
for plaintiff and against certain defendants in default. 
It 'vas also held in McConville vs. Superior Court 
of Los Angeles, 248 Pac. 553, that a formal order of the 
rourt constitutes statement of court's decision and super-
sedes a minute entry of court's decision. 
In Neblett vs. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 194 
Pac. 2nd, page 22, the reviewing court held that the find-
ings and conclusion of law signed by the trial judge 
constitutes the court's decision and supersedes any 
prior minute entry directed to be entered by the trial 
court. 
In Kansas City Pump Company vs. Jones, 104 S. W. 
1136, the Court said-that minute entries are a memorial 
of the court's action, but the judgment itself "is the 
judicial act of the court in pronouncing the law upon 
the facts in controversy as ascertained by the pleadings 
and the verdict.'' 
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McConville vs. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 
248 P. 553. 
ICreisel vs. Snavley, 115 S. W. 1059. 
In the defendant's petition (T-1) to modify the 
original decree and give force and effect to some of its 
provisions he set forth, that the plaintiff had defaulted 
under the conditions imposed upon her by the decree 
failing to pay the insurance, the interest and the balance 
of the principal $3,500.00 and in accordance with the 
decree asked that it be modified awarding him the real 
estate because he had paid the indebtedness on the prop-
c~rty and 'vas entitled to a quit claim deed from the plain-
tiff. He also asked for the oustody of the children on the 
grounds that the plaintiff was mentally and physically 
ill ; that she ''"'as not able to take care of the children 
and was neglecting them and that he had established a 
residence vlith his mother in Payson who was willing 
and able to assist him in caring for said children while 
he was at work. He also asked the court to a"\\"ard her 
$50.00 a month for the support and maintenance of her-
self when she did not have the custody of the children. 
There was no cross petition or counter affidavit filed by 
the plaintiff and that the court issued an order on June 
24, 1949, setting the hearing for the 8th day of July, 1949. 
There was a hearing on that date \Vi th the parties and 
their attorneys and apparently from the stenographer's 
notes there was some testimony given and stipulations 
entered into. When the formal order which was dated 
July 8, 1949 was presented to the court for his signature 
on March 8, 1950, the first date was apparently changed 
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bY the J udg;e, but the decree did not conform to the 
. ~ 
stenographer ,s notes "·hich "\Yere later reduced to writ-
ing and made a part of the record and the provisions in 
the formal order 'Yere different from the previous in-
tention of the court. 
Both the plaintiff and defendant 'Yere precluded by 
the court from going back of the formal order to show 
'Yhat took place at the proceedings. 
It is the further contention of the defendant that the 
petition of the plaintiff ( T -35) to modify the decree and 
H replace the same in accordance "\vith the terms con-
tained in the original decree of divorce'' did not give 
the plaintiff the right to re-open the judgment or author-
ize amendment by petition. The only remedy that the 
plaintiff had at that time was to either make a motion 
for a ne"\v trial or appeal from the formal judgment. 
Errors of court alone can be corrected only by ap-
peal from judgment or motion for a new trial or other 
statutory· motions. 
Reichert YS. Robun, 265 Pac. 260. 
In another case McKan.ney vs. McKanney, 230 Pac. 
218, that an error of law upon which a decision of judg-
ment rests cannot after entry of judgment be reviewed 
and rectified by trial court summarily or on motion, but 
can only be revie,v·ed by granting a new trial on an 
appeal. 
The legislature in adopting Section 40-3-5 of the 
lT.C .. A. 1943, relaxed in divorce proceedings the rules 
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of law calculated to maintain the sanctity and stability 
of judgments. But it is the general rule that sanctity 
and stability must be given to judgments and they should 
not be disturbed except for cogent and controlling 
reasons. 
In Fla.milton vs. Ha;milton, 89 Utah, 554; 58 Pac. 2nd 
11, this court says ''that the power of District Courts 
to make amendments in the particulars authorized by 
this Section 40-3-5 U.C.A. 1943 is not without limit, and 
that in the absence of changed conditions or circum-
stances a modification cannot be had.'' 
Cody vs. Cody, 47 Utah, 456; 154 Pac. 952. 
Tribe vs. Tribe, 59 Utah, 112; 202 Pac. 213. 
Chaffe vs. Chaffe, 63 Utah, 261 ; 225 Pac. 27. 
It is to be noted that in the petition of the plaintiff 
filed the 30th day of August 1950, she asked ''to modify 
decree and replace the same in accordance w~th the terms 
contained in the original decree of divorce and for other 
relief.'' 
She charged in her last petition that the grounds 
on which the modification was obtained that she ''"'as not 
mentally or physically ill that such statement was un-
true, had no basis in fact whatsoever, and that said 
petition was based upon a false premise and no evidenee 
was introduced that she was mentally incompetent or 
physically unfit to take cars of her children or the prop-
erty. She further charged that on July 9, 1949, the day 
after the previous hearing at Vernal, Utah, that the 
10 
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defendant rame to her place of residence, forcibly took 
the minor children into his possession and forcibly 
removed or had plaintiff removed to the' State Mental 
Hospital in ProYo, Utah. HoweYer, the uncontradicted 
testimony sho,ved that her sister and brother-in-law 
went to Vernal and forcibly put her in an automobile 
and took her to the State ~Iental Hospital at Provo. The 
evidence further showed that the defendant knew nothing 
about this move and was in no way responsible for such 
act and he did not know that she was in the State Mental 
Hospital until after she had been there one month. When 
she was released from the hospital she did not return to 
Vernal, but went to Salt Lake City and lived with a 
family by the name of Bekkemellon. Mrs. Bekkemelon 
being her cousin. There was no evidence submitted re-
garding her requirements, no evidence to show that she 
was in a position 'vhere she could take care of her 
children and no change in circumstances which would 
sustain the judgment rendered by the court. 
Point Two 
That the Court Erred By Receding From His Position 
at the Trial of the Case That the Formal Order of Modifi-
cation Signed March 8, 1950, Was Res Adjudicata For the 
Reason That the Defendant Was Procluded By the Ruling 
of the Court From Offering Any Evidence to Show What 
Took Place in the Proceedings of the Court on July 8, 1950. 
In cross-examining the plaintiff, defendant's counsel 
began to open up the matter of the proceedings on the 
8th of July 1949. The plaintiff was asked whether or not 
she was ordered to appear on that date a~d she answered 
]] 
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in the affirmative and when asked did you appear, the 
court said, 
"THE COURT: Mr. Roberts (rr-88), I won-
der if we are concerned about that~ That isn't 
a move to set aside that order modifying the de-
cree. There is no attack upon the jurisdiction of 
the Court in entering it. 
(Argument.). 
THE COURT: That's all res adjudicata (T-
88). This is no move to set aside that decree that 
was entered. I stopped Mr. Shields from going 
back of it, and I think I should stop you from 
going back of it, because that decree now stands, 
as modified by the modification order entered by 
Judge Tuckett, on the day that was found in 
examining the :files. So now our only question is: 
Have there been· material changes· since the modi-
fication of the decree, 'vhich now warrant a modi-
fication of the decree as modified~ Is there any 
doubt in counsel's mind about that~ 
MR. ROBERTS: Not a bit. 
THE COURT: All right.'' 
This case was tried on the theory that the plaintiff 
inust show material changes since the modification of 
the decree which would warrant a modification of the 
decree as modified. There was no testimony offered to 
show any changes of circumstances or her requirements 
that were different from when the original decree was 
modified. The court receded from his position that the 
modified decree was res adjudicata and set it aside in 
its entirety and went back to the original decree and 
modified that, and in his memorandum agreement ordered 
12 
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an entirely ne'v judgment 'vhich certainly was beyond 
the pleadings and the issues raised at the hearing. 
In Barlow vs. City of Inglewood, 197 Pac. 2nd, 721, 
it 'vas held that the court had no power to vacate its 
own judgment in order to correct an alleged judicial 
error as distinguished from a clerical error. 
There was also held in TT,. yllie vs. Kent, 152 Pac. 194, 
that while the trial court may order that clerical mistakes 
in the entry-of judgment be c.orrected to show the judg-
ment pronounced, that judicial error can only be 
reached by motion for new trial or appeal. 
~Iartin Ys. Ray, 170 Pac. 2nd, Page 75. 
Holmes vs. Holmes, 211 Pac. 2nd 946. 
Point Three 
That the Court Erred in Making Any Modification of 
the Previous Order at the Time of the Hearing on Novem-
ber 4, 1950, Upon the Petition of the Plaintiff and Answe~r 
of Defendant For the Reaso·n That As a Matter of Law the 
Evidence Presented Was Insufficien!t to Show Any Material 
Changes in the Circumstances of the Parties to Warrant a 
Modification of the Decree As Modified. 
Very little testimony was offered at the hearing as 
to any change in circumstances which would warrant a 
modification of the decree as amended. She had been 
living with a cousin in an apartment for several months 
prior to the hearing. She gave birth to her child in 
November of 1949 and had adopted it to the Bekken-
mellons with "\vhom she lived. She had received $5,057.00 
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( T-85) up to the time of the hearing from her mother's 
estate. There was no testimony of what her intentions 
were in regard to establishing a home or the conditions 
of her health, so that it is apparent that the judgment 
of the court went beyond the pleadings and issues pre-
sented and therefore must fall. 
Point Four 
That the Court Erred in Making Its Calculations of 
the Respective Interests of the Parties in the Real Estate 
As Set Forth in Finding 8 and 9 ( T -64) to the Extent of 
$1,000.00. 
In Finding 8 and 9, it is set forth that $2,000.00 was 
paid for the year 1947 and 1948. One thousand dollars 
was paid in 1947, making $6,000.00 which had been paid 
and the balance of the purchase price in 1948 was 
$4,000.00 represented by promissory notes secured by 
mortgage making up the $10,000.00. If there had been 
$1,000.00 paid in 1948 it would have made the purchase 
price $11,000.00. The plaintiff went in possession of the 
cabins under the original decree in September 1948, but 
.she made no payments on the mortgage after that date. 
Point Five 
That the Court Erred in Making Its Calculations of 
the Amount of Money Defendant Paid in Clearing Up the 
Indebtedness of the Real PropeTty in the Sum of $730.00 
As Set Forth in Finding 10 and 11 (T-64 and 65). 
In the calculations of the court in determining how 
much the defendant paid in clearing up the indebtedness 
14 
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on the I'eal property the rourt failed to give him credit 
for $500.00 that 'Yas paid on the principal on the $4,000.00 
note of $500.00, $60.00 interest on June 8, 1948, and 
~GO.OO interest on September -!, 1948, $21.00 interest on 
October ~9, 1948, and $39.00 interest in December 1948, 
and $.)0.00 insurance in 1949, making a total of $730.00. 
Point Six 
That the Court Erred in Making Finding Numbe·r 13 
(T-65) in Which the Court Required Defendant to Secure 
Payment of Purported Judgment in the Sum of $8,400.00 
By Obtaining a Life Insurance Policy in the Sum of $5,000.00 
Making the Plaintiff the Sole Beneficiary and to Keep Said 
Policy in Full Force and Eff.ect Until Said Judgment Was 
Paid in Full For the Reason That There is No Evidence in 
the Record to Show That the Defendant Would Be Physic-
ally Able To Obtain Such a Policy, What the Premiums 
Would Be At His Age and Whether He is Financially Able 
to Carry Such a Policy. 
There was no evidence to support Finding No. 13 in 
which the court required the defendant to obtain a 
$5,000.00 life insurance policy to be issued in the name 
of the plaintiff as beneficiary and to pay the premiums 
until the judgment was paid in full. There was no evi-
dence that he would be able to obtain such a policy at 
his age or that he \vas financially able to pay the pre-
miums on such a policy, and it is elementary law that 
a Finding not based upon the pleadings and evidence 
issues must fail. 
In conclusion we submit that under the evidence 
introduced in this case and under the argument and the 
1:1 
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authorities herein presented, the new decree should be 
set aside and the former decree be declared in full force 
and effect or have a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BEN E. ROBERTS, 
Attorney for Defendant 
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